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Article 4

You’re All Individuals: Brettschneider
on Free Speech
Andrew Koppelman†
INTRODUCTION
Brian: No, no. Please, please please listen. I’ve got one or two things
to say.
The Crowd: Tell us! Tell us both of them!
Brian: Look, you’ve got it all wrong. You don’t need to follow me. You
don’t need to follow anybody! You’ve got to think for yourselves!
You’re all individuals!
The Crowd (speaking in impressive unison): Yes! We’re all
individuals!
Brian: You’re all different!
The Crowd: Yes! We are all different!
Man in crowd: I’m not . . .
Man in crowd: Shhh!
Brian: You’ve all got to work it out for yourselves.
The Crowd: Yes! We’ve got to work it out for ourselves!
Brian: Exactly!
The Crowd: Tell us more!1

Liberalism, Corey Brettschneider tells us, is uneasily
poised between two dystopias, which he calls the Invasive State
and the Hateful Society. The Invasive State constantly and
intrusively monitors and punishes ordinary citizens for saying
and doing anything, even in private, that is antagonistic to the
values of free and equal citizenship. The Hateful Society is
† John Paul Stevens Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science,
Northwestern University. Thanks to Corey Brettschneider and Martin Redish for
comments on an earlier draft, and to Marcia Lehr for research assistance.
1 MONTY PYTHON’S LIFE OF BRIAN (Sony Pictures 1979).
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characterized by a discriminatory culture that generates political
inequality. “It has seemed that we are faced with a dilemma”2
between these two choices.
The solution—the solution, Brettschneider argues—is that
the liberal state must allow hateful speech, but must also publicly
condemn it. “Although citizens should retain rights to disagree
with antidiscrimination laws, the state has the obligation to use
its expressive capacities to defend the values of free and equal
citizenship against criticism from hateful or discriminatory
groups and individuals.”3 This expression by the state evidently is
both necessary and sufficient to avoid both dystopias: “In this way
the state can protect the right to express all viewpoints and, at
the same time, it can defend the values of freedom and equality
against discriminatory and racist challenges.”4
It isn’t that simple.
I.

ONE SIZE FITS ALL

Brettschneider is offering an ideal theory: in a wellfunctioning society, the state will tell citizens to reject hateful
ideas. The citizens will think what the state tells them to think.
Although “there should be a wide role for citizens in defending the
core liberal democratic values,”5 the state has little discretion
about whether or when to exercise its persuasive capacities.
State-sponsored condemnation of ideas that oppose free and equal
citizenship is a “duty . . . as a matter of political morality.”6
This ideal is not contingent on how effective government
speech is likely to be—something that certainly varies from one
society to another. Nor is it contingent on how prevalent such
ideas happen to be in any particular society. That varies too.
Prejudice against the Irish used to be pervasive in the United
States. Now it is nearly nonexistent. But if, anywhere in this
vast land, there is a single lonely crank who casts aspersions
on the liberty and equality of the Irish, government has a duty
to hunt him down and denounce him.
Brettschneider thinks the state’s exercise of its moral
authority will “effectively counter the spread of hateful

2 COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, WHEN THE STATE SPEAKS, WHAT SHOULD IT SAY?
HOW DEMOCRACIES CAN PROTECT EXPRESSION AND PROMOTE EQUALITY 170 (2012).
3 Id. at 6.
4 Id. at 3-4.
5 Id. at 13.
6 Id. at 119.
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viewpoints,”7 and that this authority should “counter the concerns”8
of those who worry about the stability of democracy. Does he
really believe that this alone will guarantee that minority
rights will be respected in democratic politics?9 He never
explicitly says that, but he endlessly repeats variations on the
sentences I just quoted, and he presents this and nothing else
as the solution to the dilemma he describes.
Brettschneider’s most innovative proposals call for the
state to expressly discriminate against hateful views in the
granting of subsidies and nonprofit status, and accordingly to
abandon neutrality in limited public fora. If it does not do this,
he claims, it could be perceived as endorsing the hateful views
that it is protecting.10 But linguistic meaning always depends on
the background assumptions shared by speaker and audience.
When the Westboro Baptist Church is granted the same taxexempt status as every other church, does anyone really think that
the state is endorsing its hateful antigay and anti-Catholic views?11
Sometimes state pedagogy is helpful to the cause of
liberal democracy. But this is a non-ideal state of affairs. In his
earlier, much better book, Democratic Rights, Brettschneider
defended judicial review, but argued that it is decidedly a secondbest solution: respect for individual rights ideally emerges from
an unfettered electoral process rather than from being imposed
from above.12 That respect also ideally emerges from civil society,
rather than being dictated by the state.13 The state is not a
reliable source of moral wisdom. Good liberal citizens know that.
Brettschneider’s idea that the government, in particular,
has a duty to speak implies that the state is uniquely authoritative.
Id. at 110.
Id. at 17. He acknowledges that in some “emergency situations” his
solution may not be adequate. Id. at 18.
9 In South Africa, the government has been a world leader in gay rights, but
violence against gay people is pervasive, and police ignore it. “Corrective rape,” the
practice of raping gay men and lesbians in an effort to change their sexual orientation, is not
only common, but is frequently abetted by the victims’ families. Clare Carter, The Brutality
of “Corrective Rape,” N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2013/07/26/opinion/26corrective-rape.html.
10 BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 2 at 16, 84, 113, 138-39.
11 Id. at 133-34.
12 See COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS: THE SUBSTANCE OF
SELF-GOVERNMENT 136-59 (2007).
13 At one point, Brettschneider concedes this: “Ideally, reflective revision might
be prompted by the persuasion and reasoning of one’s fellow citizens in civil society.”
BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 2 at 66. But this ideal sits uneasily beside the incessantly
repeated claim that the state has an “obligation” to speak. In arguing for a distinctive
state role, he also observes that “only a representative of the people as a whole . . . can
speak on behalf of the polity in condemning and apologizing for past injustices.” Id. at 41.
That is certainly true, but it is a minor part of the state speech he has in mind.
7
8
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That premise is a familiar part of the legitimizing mythology of the
modern state, which imagines itself as a kind of secular God—a
uniquely stabilizing and valid source of obligations.14 That
mythology is a fact of life, and sometimes liberals will need to
deploy it rhetorically. But they should never do so without disgust.
Brettschneider is oblivious to these objections. The
counterarguments he sees fit to address are often silly. Does
anyone really believe that what happens in civil society ought to
be immune from criticism?15 That the state has an “obligation to
guarantee the equal success of all viewpoints”?16 That any
criticism of specific objectionable tenets of a particular hateful
religious group will pressure citizens to abandon religion itself?17
He critiques these claims at length, but his citations offer no
evidence that they have any proponents.
The question of just how the proper operation of a
liberal society—a complex system with a complex range of
possible pathologies—is to be promoted is one that presents
different specific problems, and so requires different strategies
from one time and place to another. Sometimes the Monty
Python joke I quoted at the beginning really is the appropriate
path. Post-World War II Japan under U.S. General MacArthur
looked a lot like that: liberal prescriptions issued by a military
dictator.18 The problem Brettschneider raises calls for a rich
variety of strategies. What would you think of someone who
claimed that whatever goes wrong with your car can be fixed by
replacing the transmission fluid?
II.

FREELY THEY STOOD WHO STOOD

What does not vary is the fact that there is no way to be
certain that citizens will not abandon the values that
(Brettschneider has nicely shown in Democratic Rights) are
integral to democracy. “If citizens are protected in their ability to
say and believe whatever they wish by a set of liberal rights, there
is no guarantee that they will engage in reflective revision [of
hateful beliefs], as shown by the spread of hate groups in the
United States and Europe.”19 Yes. There is no guarantee. Ever.
14 See WILLIAM T. CAVANAUGH, THE MYTH OF RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE: SECULAR
IDEOLOGY AND THE ROOTS OF MODERN CONFLICT 128-29 (2009).
15 BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 2 at 27, 52, 69, 110, 166, 168.
16 Id. at 80; see also id. at 79, 110, 112. This one is not only silly but incoherent.
17 Id. at 157, 159-60.
18 WILLIAM MANCHESTER, AMERICAN CAESAR: DOUGLAS MACARTHUR 1880–
1964 460-70 (1978).
19 BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 43.
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The problem cannot be solved by state speech or by anything
else. People with free will can make bad choices.
This has been a persistent anxiety in free speech theory,
and it is one that we will always have to live with.20 It is
already present in John Milton’s germinal defense of free speech.
Milton’s principal reason for opposing the licensing of printing is
religious: free will means the freedom to choose evil. Salvation is
to be achieved only by struggle against temptation. “Assuredly we
bring not innocence into the world, we bring impurity much
rather: that which purifies us is trial, and trial is by what is
contrary.”21 It follows that “all opinions, yea errors, known, read,
and collated, are of main service and assistance toward the
speedy attainment of what is truest.”22
Like Brettschneider, Milton was sanguine about the
consequences of unregulated speech:
And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the
earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and

20

It is not, however, a “paradox,” as Larry Alexander alleges:

If it outlaws illiberalism, its credentials as a liberal state appear to be
undermined. If it permits illiberalism, it licenses Robert Frost’s derogatory
quip that liberalism can’t take its own side in an argument. Either way,
liberalism appears self-contradictory and incoherent. It must either betray its
principles or betray itself (and thereby betray its principles). Liberalism both
appears to be possible—we’ve seen it done—and impossible (it can’t be done).
Larry Alexander, Free Speech and ‘Democratic Persuasion’: A Response to Brettschneider
(June 11, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2277849. I can take
my own side in an argument without needing to hit anyone who disagrees with me.
The incoherence is present only if one presumes that human will finds intolerable the
existence of other beings with free will. Jean-Paul Sartre argued this, see Andrew
Koppelman, Sex Equality and/or the Family: From Bloom vs. Okin to Rousseau vs.
Hegel, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 399, 427-28 (1992), but he wasn’t a liberal.
21 JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (1644), reprinted in COMPLETE POEMS AND
MAJOR PROSE 716, 728 (Merritt Y. Hughes ed., 1957).
22 Id. at 727. The importance of a free choice between good and evil is
likewise emphasized in JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST, bk. 3, l. 102-10 (1674), reprinted
in COMPLETE POEMS AND MAJOR PROSE 173, 260 (Merritt Y. Hughes ed., 1957). The
speaker here is God the Father, explaining why it was right to allow the rebel angels
and, later, Adam to transgress:
Freely they stood who stood, and fell who fell.
Not free, what proof could they have giv’n sincere
Of true allegiance, constant Faith or Love,
Where only what they needs must do, appear’d,
Not what they would? what praise could they receive?
What pleasure I from such obedience paid,
When Will and Reason (Reason also is choice)
Useless and vain, of freedom both despoil’d,
Made passive both, had serv’d necessity,
Not mee.
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prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple;
who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter.23

But Milton’s confidence also depended on his religious
views. Vincent Blasi observes:
Milton’s sweeping generalization about the strength of truth was not
offered in the spirit of empirical demonstration, nor even that of didactic
history. Milton here was simply affirming, once again, his faith in divine
providence.”24 This faith “can have no secular analogue.25

Milton did not rely on the state as a source of moral (which
for him meant religious) authority. He doubted the state’s
reliability,26 but he also thought that even correct religious doctrine
would not bring about salvation if it was the consequence of blind
conformity rather than active engagement with religious questions.
“A man may be a heretic in the truth; and if he believe things only
because his pastor says so, or the Assembly so determines, without
knowing other reason, though his belief be true, yet the very truth
he holds becomes his heresy.”27 Milton’s ideal citizens are, in this
respect, better liberals than Brettschneider’s.
Alexander Meiklejohn, on whom Brettschneider relies,
exalts free will for Miltonic reasons. In modern free speech theory,
there has been a persistent problem about whether those who
reject democracy are entitled to free speech.28 Meiklejohn offered
the best response: “A government is maintained by the free
consent of its citizens only so long as the choice whether or not it
shall be maintained is recognized as an open choice, which the
people may debate and decide, with conflicting advocacies,
whenever they may choose.”29 Meiklejohn’s argument is essentially
MILTON, supra note 21, at 746.
Vincent Blasi, Milton’s Areopagitica and the Modern First Amendment, 1,
9 (Yale Law Sch. Legal Scholarship Repository: Occasional Papers 1995), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/yale/ylsop/papers/6.
25 Id.
26 See generally JOHN MILTON, CONSIDERATIONS TOUCHING THE LIKELIEST
MEANS TO REMOVE HIRELINGS OUT OF THE CHURCH (1659), reprinted in COMPLETE
POEMS AND MAJOR PROSE 856, 878-79 (Merritt Y. Hughes ed., 1957).
27 MILTON, supra note 21, at 739. Milton’s caricature of deference to religious
authority anticipates Monty Python. Id. at 739-40.
28 See Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 IND. L.J. 1, 31 (1971); Carl A. Auerbach, The Communist Control Act of 1954: A
Proposed Legal-Political Theory of Free Speech, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 173, 186-89 (1956).
29 Alexander Meiklejohn, What Does the First Amendment Mean?, 20 U. CHI. L.
REV. 461, 468 (1953). Another, similarly Miltonic formulation: “If men are not free to ask and
to answer the question, ‘Shall the present form of our government be maintained or changed?’;
if, when that question is asked, the two sides of the issue are not equally open for
consideration, for advocacy, and for adoption, then it is impossible to speak of our government
as established by the free choice of a self-governing people.” ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN,
POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 123 (1960).
23

24
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the same as Milton’s: in order for the choice of good to be authentic,
there must be a real option to choose evil. Meiklejohn, however, is
curiously evasive about the dangers. He does not have Milton’s
assurance of God making it all right in the end.30
If autonomy is the only thing that matters, of course, then
this is not a problem. T.M. Scanlon argued that respect for
citizens’ autonomy entails that speech cannot be prohibited
simply because it results in listeners having false beliefs, or in
listeners coming to believe that they ought to perform certain
harmful actions, however bad the consequences of such beliefs
might be.31 He later recanted, precisely because the principle was
too cost-insensitive. It may be that there should be some
restriction on the costs that government should take as a
justification for restrictions on speech, he wrote, but such an
argument “must itself be based on a full consideration of all the
relevant costs.”32 Scanlon invoked Milton’s concern about
authentic choice, but he retreated from his absolutism, because he
lacked Milton’s assurance that authentic choice is more important
than anything else.33 You can still support free speech on the
grounds Scanlon articulated—I do—but you have to be open to
the possibility that those grounds are overridden if the
consequences are bad enough.
Brettschneider is in this tradition. Toleration of illiberal
speech is demanded by respect for the independent judgment of
free and equal citizens: “[I]t is essential to the legitimacy of
value democracy that they could choose to embrace inegalitarian
principles and policies.”34 But the whole project demands that
they not do so. It is inescapably consequentialist.
Milton accepted the dangerous consequences of his
doctrine, because he believed there is an ultimate Guarantor to
30 Other early proponents of free speech were more explicit about the hazards
of the undertaking. Justice Holmes wrote that free speech “is an experiment, as all of
life is an experiment.” Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brandeis thought that maintaining a free society required courage.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see
Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis
Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653 (1988).
31 Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
204, 213-14 (1972).
32 T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40
U. PITT. L. REV. 519, 533 (1979).
33 Frederick Schauer’s critique of Scanlon misses his Miltonian dimension:
Schauer thinks that if the state can deem some conduct impermissible, it logically
follows that it can censor speech advocating that conduct. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE
SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 70-71 (1982). By this logic, God should not have
permitted the serpent to communicate with Eve.
34 BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 77.

1030

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:3

assure us that the dangers are worth it. Brettschneider, on the
other hand, has no assurance that one day Christ will return
and make everything okay. Happy talk about state speech is a
poor substitute.
There is no way to be sure that the freedom that is argued
for will not be used to bring about the consequences that are
feared. Somehow the citizens must be persuaded to use their
freedom well. Perhaps government can do the persuading. But it
is better if the ideas of freedom and equality are so deeply
ingrained in the culture that the government has no work to do.
Any consequentialist case for a given liberty is likely to
rest on some combination of optimism (about what will happen
absent regulation) and distrust (of the government actors who
would regulate the liberty in question).35 The warrant for either
of these will vary from one society to another. Too much
optimism and you have the Hateful Society. Too little distrust
and you have the Invasive State.
In the United States, as it happens, there is plenty of
evidence that supports optimism about a regime with robust free
speech protection.36 Overt racism has been nearly eliminated
during the period when the First Amendment was construed to
give strong protection to racist speech, and it is not at all clear that
the state’s tutelary function, rather than vigorous discussion within
civil society, was responsible.37 The growth of religious tolerance,
too, is largely the product of private initiative rather than state
speech.38 Maybe state speech can help, but assessing when and
whether this is so requires a more nuanced understanding of the
cultural basis of liberalism than Brettschneider offers.

35 ANDREW KOPPELMAN WITH TOBIAS BARRINGTON WOLFF, A RIGHT TO
DISCRIMINATE? HOW THE CASE OF BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA V. JAMES DALE WARPED
THE LAW OF FREE ASSOCIATION 2-3, 64-80 (2009).
36 See Andrew Koppelman, Waldron, Responsibility-Rights, and Hate Speech,
43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1201, 1215-21 (2011).
37 The most important state intervention was probably the Civil Rights Act of
1964, but it did considerably more than lecture citizens about equality.
38 See KEVIN M. SCHULTZ, TRI-FAITH AMERICA: HOW CATHOLICS AND JEWS
HELD POSTWAR AMERICA TO ITS PROTESTANT PROMISE (2011).

